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I. INTRODUCTION 
During April 2000, the United States Supreme Court prescribed a 
comparatively thorough set of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. These amendments took effect in December 2000. 1 That 
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, Uni\'ersity of Nc\'ada. Las 
Vegas. I wish to thank Michael Higdon, Peg__cy Sanner, and Jeff Stempel for \'aluablc 
suggestions, Angela Dufva for processing this piece, and Jim Rogers for generous, 
continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
1. Amendments to Federal Rules of Cfril Procedure, 192 F.R.D. 340 12000) 
[hereinafter Amendmellts]. The F.RD. reprinting of the revisions is referred lo because it 
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development represented the culmination of a rule revision proceeding 
commenced in 1996 by the Judicial Conference of the United States 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (Advisory Committee). Because 
certain provisos that the Supreme Court included in the 2000 amendments 
are rather controversial and could alter significant features of modern 
federal civil litigation primarily involving discovery, these revisions 
deserve assessment.2 This Essay undertakes that effort by emphasizing 
changes in mandatory prediscovery, automatic disclosure, and the scope of 
discovery. 
The first section of this Essay surveys the historical background of the 
2000 group of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
second portion of the Essay selectively evaluates the most contested and 
important constituents of the package of revisions and analyzes the 
effects that federal district court implementation of the 2000 amendments 
alone and together will apparently have. Ascertaining that several 
modifications are somewhat controversial and that, individually or in 
combination, they could have relatively significant impacts, the third 
segment affords suggestions for future action that members of the 
legislative and judicial branches, lawyers and parties should consider. 
II. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 2000 AMENDMENTS 
The United States Supreme Court has promulgated three major sets of 
alterations in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since 1980. 3 The 
initial group constituted the first attempt to narrow the broad, flexible 
system of discovery that the original Federal Rules had instituted in 1938; 
however, the comparatively inconsequential character of the 1980 effort 
prompted a vociferous dissent by Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who 
predicted that "Congress' acceptance of these tinkering changes [would] 
is the most accessible version. 
2. The revisions took effect because Congress did not exercise its power under 
the Rules Enabling Act to reject or modify the amendments. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) 
(1994). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. 
L. REv. l015 (1982) (reinterpreting the Rules Enabling Act based on an analysis of its 
pre-1934 history); Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 
46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1599-1600 (1994) (describing Congress's 1988 revision of the 
rulemaking process). 
3. Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 507 U.S. 1091 (1993 ); 
Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. I097 (1983); Order 
Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997 ( 1980). For the history 
before 1980, see generally John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal 
Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 513-20 (2000) (describing rulemakers' attempts to create 
an effective system of pretrial discovery); Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions 
Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. 
REV. 691 (1998) (explaining the changing attitudes toward discovery). 
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delay for years the adoption of genuinely effective refonns.'..i Despite 
Justice Powell's prognostication, the Supreme Court prescribed a second, 
rather comprehensive package of amendments during 1983. This set of 
revisions (1) mandated that discovery be proportionate to the needs of a 
particular case; (2) enhanced district judges' control over the pretrial 
litigation process as a general matter and over discovery specifically; and 
(3) increased judicial authority to impose sanctions on litigants and 
attorneys for contravening requirements that covered prefiling 
investigations in Federal Rule 11, pretrial conferences in Federal Rule 16, 
and discovery in Federal Rule 26.5 
The 1983 amendment of Rule 11 became the most controversial revision 
in the half-century history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That 
situation prompted the Federal Rule revision entities to modify the 
provision a decade later as one important component of a group of 
amendments, including a revision imposing compulsory automatic 
disclosure. That amendment was itself the most disputed proposal ever to 
alter the Federal Rules.6 Virtually all segments of the organized bar 
adamantly opposed the recommendations that related to automatic 
disclosure. Practicing attorneys criticized the approach suggested because 
they contended that the concept would require another unnecessary layer 
of discovery, erode the traditional adversary process, and create a 
4. Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997. 1000 
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). See Stephen B. Burbank. Sanctions in tlie Proposed 
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions .<\bout Poll'er. 11 
HOFSlRA L. REv. 997, 998-1000 (1983). See generally Richard L Marcus. Discm·el)· 
Contaimnent Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 753-60 (1998) (discussing the history and 
compromises leading to the 1980 Amendments); Anhur R. Miller, Co11jide111ialil)'. 
Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Cozms, 105 HARV. L Rev. 427. 456-59 
(1991) (describing the 1980 Amendments and the reaction to them). 
5. See Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 
(1983). See generally ARTIIUR R. Mill.ER, THE AUGUST 1983 Al\tENDME.'\"TS TO TiiE 
FEDERAL RUI.ES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGE.'.IE..'-T AND 
LAWYERREsPONSIBILllY (1984) {analyzing the 1983 Amendments); Subrin, supra note 
3, at 744-45 (noting that since 1983, the amount of discovery must be proponional to the 
needs of a particular case). 
6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) (1994) (prior to 2000 amendmentl; see t1/so Griffin 
B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Disco1·el)'-Tlze Ruslz to Refomz. 27 GA. L Rev. 
1, 17-18 (1992) (noting the existence of local automatic disclosure rules in three district 
courts prior to the 1993 amendment of Rule 26(a)(l )); Marcus, s11pm note 4, at 76-t-68 
(describing the background of and reaction to the 1993 Amendments); Elizabeth G. 
Thornburg, Givu1g the "Hai•es" a Little More: Considering rlze 1998 Discm·el)' 
Proposals, 52 SMU L. REv. 229, 233-36 (1999) (discussing the opposition to the 
automatic disclosure rules in the 1993 Amendments); Tobias, supra note 2. at 1611-13 
(describing the process of amending Rule 26). 
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number of ethical dilemmas, especially implicating counsel and clients. 
The approach would also leave unclear precisely what information 
parties must disclose, thus promoting unwarranted and costly satellite 
litigation over the concept's terminology.7 The 1993 changes concomitantly 
empowered all ninety-four federal district courts to "opt out" of the 
mandatory automatic disclosure strictures and authorized parties to alter by 
stipulation this provision as well as several additional discovery requirements, 
such as those that imposed presumptive numerical limitations on discovery 
techniques (including interrogatories).8 
During 1996, the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee-which has 
principal responsibility for analyzing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and developing constructive recommendations for improvement-
appointed a Discovery Subcommittee to consider the prospect of further 
amending the provisions that govern discovery.9 The Advisory Committee 
created this entity despite several facts. First, the Supreme Court had 
adopted several significant packages of discovery modifications during 
the preceding decade-and-a-half, one set a mere three years before. 10 
Second, most Federal Rules alterations need a generation of implementation 
and assessment to formulate reliable conclusions about their relative 
efficacy. 11 Third, an increasing number of federal court observers have 
7. See, e.g., Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 507 U.S. 
1091, 1099 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Bell et al., s11pra note 6, at 28-32. Recent 
discussions of the opposition to the 1993 automatic discovery rule include Thornburg. 
s11pra note 6, at 233-35; Eric L. Home, Changes in Discovery Proced11res Under the 
Federal R11les, PA. L. WEEKLY, July 3, 2000, at 13, 20. 
8. See FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a)(l), 29 (1994) (prior to 2000 amendment); infra note 
24 and accompanying text. See generally Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? 
Dis11nionism in the Federal Co11rts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929 (1996) (deploring the variety of 
local rules in federal courts); Marcus, s11pra note 4, at 766-68 (noting the Advisory 
Committee's decision to permit local courts to opt out of the new automatic disclosure 
rule); Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory Disclos11re and Local Abrogation: Jn Search of a 
Theory For Optional R11les, 14 REV. LmG. 49 (1994) (discussing the authorized 
abrogation of Rule 26 by local district courts); Tobias, s11pra note 2, at 1612-15 
(describing the process leading to adoption of the opt out provisions and the responses of 
local district courts). 
9. See Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Committee on 
Civil Rules, to Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, reprinted in 181F.R.D.24, 25 (1998) [hereinafter Stotler, Memorandum]; Paul 
V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are The Federal Discovery R11les Really in Need of 
Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REv. 517, 521 (1998) [hereinafter Niemeyer, Here We Go 
Again]. 
10. See s11pra notes 3-8 and accompanying text. 
11. Reporters for the Advisory Committee so asserted. See Marvin E. Frankel, 
Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil R11le 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 52-53 (1967) 
(citing Professor Benjamin Kaplan's view); Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters 
and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 
664, 677 (1979) (same). 
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urged the revisors to amend the Federal Rules less often. 12 
The Discovery Subcommittee probed the need for change in the 
discovery provisos primarily with studies of discovery. It authorized 
evaluations by the FederaJ Judicial Center (FJC), the major research arm 
of the federal courts, and by the RAND Corporation Institute for Civil 
Justice (RAND), which had recently completed a thorough analysis of 
expense and delay reduction measures applied in the federal district 
courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990. 0 After 
examination of the results of these assessments and some additional 
applicable material, the Discovery Subcommittee suggested that the 
Advisory Committee propose numerous modifications to the discovery 
provisions.14 In early 1998, the Advisory Committee developed a group of 
proposed revisions of the discovery rules and tendered these 
recommendations to the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (Standing Committee), which is responsible for 
considering the suggested improvements in the Federal Rules that the 
Judicial Conference advisory committees assemble. 15 During the summer 
of 1998, the Standing Committee published the proposed amendments and 
sought public comment.16 The following June, the Standing Committee 
12 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, lg11ora11ce and Procedural um· Refom1: "\ Ct1/I 
for a Moratoriwn, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 854-55 (1993). See generc1/ly John B. 
Oakley, An Open Letter 011 Refom1illg the Process of Re1•ising the Federal R11lt•s, 55 
MONT. L. REV. 435, 436 (1994) (arguing that "[t)oo many rc\•isions representing the 
personal views of those with power over the rulemaking process are being promulgated 
too frequently"); Thornburg, supra note 6, al 230-33 (arguing that the proposed 1998 
revisions of the rules are not neutral or efficient and should be rejected). 
13. See Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Commiucc on 
Civil Rules, to Anthony H. Scirica, Chair, Commiuee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, repri11ted in 192 F.R.D. 354, 357-58 (2000) [hereinafter Sdrica. 
Memorandum]; James S. Kakalik et al., Disco1·el)' Manageme111: F11nlwr 1\n11lysis of the 
Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998); Thomas E. 
\Vtllging et al., An Empirical Study of Disco1·el)' and Disclosure Pmctice Undt•r the 
1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REv. 525 (l 998); see also Beckerman, s11pr<1 
note 3, ·at 506-09 (describing the results of the RAND and FJC reports); Thornburg. 
supra note 6, at 246-49 (same). 
14. See Stotler, Memorandum, supra note 9, at 24; Marcus. supr.z note 4. al 768-
84. 
15. See Stotler, Memorandum, supra note 9, at 24; Terry Carter, The forest 
Discovery Mission: Judges Set to Debate Changes that \Vould Make New Fedeml Rules 
Mandatory, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1999, at 20. On a nine-to-four vote, the Advisory 
Committee refused to omit the proviso that would narrow discovery's scope. See 
Scirica, Memorandum, supra note 13, at 359-60; Beckerman, supra note 3, at 542 n.154. 
16. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States, Proposed Amendmellls to the Federal Rules of CM/ Proct•tlure anti 
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evaluated the public input, made a small number of comparatively 
insignificant changes, and then forwarded the package of revisions to the 
Judicial Conference of the United States.17 In September 1999, the Judicial 
Conference concurred with all of the amendments recommended by the 
Standing Committee, except for a proviso that imposed "cost-
bearing,"18 and submitted the revisions suggested to the Supreme Court. 19 
Once the Justices had assessed the set of amendments, the Court transmitted 
the group of revisions unaltered to Congress in April 2000. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE 2000 AMENDMENTS 
The following part of this Essay begins with a descriptive and critical 
evaluation of the Supreme Court's 2000 amendments to the discovery 
strictures. The Essay then considers the effects that the provisions could 
have individually and together. This section emphasizes those revisions 
which promise to implement the most substantial changes in the present 
discovery regime or which have generated the greatest controversy, even 
though others might be equally important or controversial once federal 
judges have applied and construed the new provisos and attorneys and 
parties have attempted to satisfy them. 
A. Specific Amendments 
I. Automatic Disclosure 
The 2000 amendment to Federal Rule 26(a)(l) significantly alters the 
1993 revision that required a party to divulge material that is "relevant to 
disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings."20 The new 
Evidence, 181 F.R.D. 18 (1998) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments]. See generally Carl 
Tobias, Discovery Refonn Redux, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1433 (1999) (describing the 
proposed revisions). 
17. On a ten-to-two vote, the Standing Committee refused to omit the proviso that 
would narrow discovery's scope. Letter from Richard H. Middleton, Jr., President, 
Association of Trial Lawyers of America, to William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the 
United States 6 (Apr.12, 2000) (on file with author); see also infra notes 36-46 and 
accompanying text (discussing the narrowed scope of discovery contained in the 
Amendment to Rule 26(b)(l)). 
18. Cost bearing would have empowered district judges to permit discovery 
that was disproportionate to the needs of a case only if the litigant who sought 
greater discovery paid for it. Proposed Amendments, supra note 16, at 87-89 
(discussing proposed amendment to Rule 34(b)); see Thornburg, supra note 6, at 240; 
Tobias, supra note 16, at 1441. 
19. The Standing Committee, on a thirteen-to-twelve vote, also refused to omit 
the provision that would narrow discovery's scope. See Letter from Professor Thomas 
D. Rowe, Duke Law School, to Carl Tobias, Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School 
of Law (Nov. 19, I 999)(on file with author). 
20. FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a)(I) (1994) (prior to 2000 amendment); Amendments, 
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provision commands only that a litigant disclose information that 
"support[s] its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment."21 The 
2000 amendment thus narrows the 1993 version because the modified 
version mandates automatic exchange of less material. 22 The 2000 
revision also applies nationally in each of the federal district courts.23 
This situation substantially differs from the one that existed under the 
1993 proviso, which authorized all districts to "opt out" by adopting 
local variations on the federal requirements or by eschewing those 
commands; numerous courts relied on that provision to reject the 
strictures in the federal amendment. 24 
The rule revisors, in particular the Judicial Conference Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee, apparently based the alteration implicating 
automatic disclosure mainly on two important perceptions. The first was 
the controversial nature of the disclosure requirements that the 1993 
amendment had imposed.25 The second was a notion that the opt-out 
measure had additionally fractured the already fragmented condition of 
federal civil practice because the mechanism encouraged the district courts 
to institute local disclosure procedures that diverged from the federal 
disclosure strictures or to reject them altogether. 26 
supra note 1, at 382; see also Rogelio A Lasso, Gladiarors Be Gone: Tlze Nt'll" Disclosure 
Rules Compel a Reexa111i11atio11 of the Adi·ersary Process. 36 B.C. L REV. 479. 489-90 
(1995) (describing the disclosure requlred by the 1993 Amendment of Ruic 26); Charles 
W. Sorensen, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of CM/ Procedure 26(11>- "'Much 1\do 
About Nothing?," 46 HAsTINGS L.J. 679, 721-24 (1995) (same); Thornburg. supr<1 note 
6, at 236-37 (same). 
21. Ame11dme11ts, supra note 1, at 382. 
22. The new stricture will invariably limit incentives to plead with particularity 
and thus honor the notice pleading system in the Federal Rules. See Beckerman, s11pr<1 
note 3, at 534-43; Richard L. Marcus, The Rei•fra/ of Fact Pleading Under the Fcder.1/ 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433 (1986). However, the change that 
narrows discovery's scope could enhance the incentives to plead with specificity. See 
infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text 
23. See Ame11dme11ts, supra note I, at 384-85 (advisory commiuec's note); see 
also Ame11dme11ts, supra note 1, at 391 (advisory committee's note) (stating that the 2000 
revisions omit local option provisions for limitations on depositions and interrogatories I. 
24. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(l) (1994) (prior to 2000 amendment); set• t1lst1 oo ... SA 
STIENSTRA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER. lMPLE.MEl\'TATION OF DISCLOSURE IN UstTED 
STATES DISlRICT COURTS WITii SPECIAC ATIENT!OS TO COURTS' RESPONSES TO 
SELECTED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26 (Mar. 30, 19981. 
reprinted in 182 F.R.D. 304 (1998) (describing variation in district couns' lm.ul rut~ 
regarding automatic disclosure); supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
25. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
26. See Niemeyer, Here We Go Again, supra note 9. at 519: Willging et al •• supm 
note 13, at 541; Horne, supra note 7, at 13; supra notes 8, 24 and accompanying text. 
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These perceptions may have been incorrect, however. First, the 1993 
disclosure revision has seemingly been less controversial than certain 
observers had predicted. For example, the FJC evaluation determined 
that many more attorneys "reported that initial disclosure decreased 
litigation expense, time from filing to disposition, the amount of discovery, 
and the number of discovery disputes than said it increased them."27 The 
FJC assessment also observed that "many more attorneys said initial 
disclosure increased overall procedural fairness, the fairness of the case 
outcome, and the prospects of settlement than said it decreased them."28 
Second, the opt-out technique might have balkanized federal civil 
procedure considerably less than numerous critics had asserted. For 
instance, only sixteen percent of lawyers whom the FJC surveyed 
thought that the application of conflicting automatic disclosure 
provisions and discovery devices across federal districts created serious 
difficulties, and a mere six percent believed that intradistrict 
inconsistency produced such problems. 29 
It is unclear why the Advisory Committee chose to suggest the 
modifications in automatic disclosure at this juncture. The FJC and 
RAND studies indicate that the 1993 amendment instituting disclosure 
has operated rather effectively. Insofar as the revision has appeared to 
function less well, this perception could have resulted from the 
comparatively limited implementation and analysis that the amendment has 
received or from the controversy that attended the initial consideration 
and prescription of the 1993 disclosure concept. 
Even if the current need for change were substantially greater, the 
2000 revision might not represent a very significant improvement. The 
amendment replaces terminology that has comparatively definite 
meaning, and to which judges, attorneys, and parties are accustomed, 
with phraseology that might prove to be rather unclear. The new 
language could correspondingly foster ancillary litigation over its 
construction and the scope of disclosure mandated, thereby imposing 
unnecessary cost and delay.30 Moreover, the requirement that litigants 
27. Willging et al., supra note 13, at 535. 
28. Id. The FJC found minimal evidence that disclosure requirements led to 
satellite litigation. Id. The RAND study concurred with this finding but dctennincd that 
disclosure or lack thereof had little impact on expense or delay. See Kakalik ct al., supra 
note 13, at 658, 678. 
29. See Willging et al., supra note 13, at 583 tbl.34. The FJC did assert that 
growing numbers of judges and attorneys have claimed that inconsistency in the 
disclosure and discovery rules presents serious problems that deserve resolution. Id. at 
541-42, 583-84. Sixty percent of counsel surveyed believe that interdistrict conflicts 
pose difficulty. Id. at 583. "Altogether, just over half the districts have implemented 
26(a)(l)." STIENSTRA, supra note 24, at 309. 
30. See Home, supra note 7, at 20; Pearl Zuchlewski, Proposed Amendments May 
Transfonn Federal Civil Discovery Rules, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 10, 1999, at 1. See generally 
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release less information might complicate plaintiffs' attempts to secure the 
material those parties need for proving and settling the litigation they 
pursue.31 Furthermore, the 2000 revision modifies the disclosure strictures 
that apply in all cases, even though the FJC and RAND assessments 
determined that the 1993 amendment caused difficulties in rather few 
lawsuits, particularly complex litigation. 32 
In the end, the rule revisors, most significantly the members of the 
Advisory Committee, seemed ambivalent about the disclosure notion.n 
The Advisory Committee apparently conceded that judges and lawyers have 
not subscribed wholeheartedly to the 1993 revision and that the disclosure 
provision has minimally affected discovery, but at the same time, the 
Committee evidenced unwillingness to jettison the idea and attempted to 
preserve some vestige of it.34 The Advisory Committee's perspective, 
thus, may partly reflect the ambivalence expressed by many judges and 
counsel.35 
2. Scope of Discoi•ery 
The 2000 amendment also narrows the scope of discovery that the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have traditionally allowed parties. For 
decades, litigants have been able to secure material that is "relevant to 
Beckerman, supra note 3, at 540-41. 
31. See Thornburg, supra note 6, at 249-54; Home, supra note 7, at 20; 
Zuchlewski, supra note 30, at 6. The new disclosure rules also apply natiom\ide, 
sacrificing the district courts' flexibility to match the device with local circums1anccs 
and ability to engage in experimentation that might identify a superior disclosure 
procedure. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text; see also Tobias, supr.i note 2, 
at 1615-16 (suggesting that local variation may help identify the most effective 
disclosure mechanism); Carter, supra note 15, at 20 (noting that allO\\ing local variation 
in disclosure rules "created laboratories for litigation reform"). 
32. See Beckerman, supra note 3, at 506-09; Kakalik et al., supra note 13, at 682: 
Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pen·asfre Discm·er:i· Abuse: Tiu: Sequel. 39 
B.C. L. REv. 683, 685-86 (1998); Thornburg, supra note 6, at 246-49: Willging et al., 
supra note 13, at 551. 
33. See Edward D. Cavanagh, Obstacles i11 the Scarclifor Tmrli: Propoml • .\mmdmaus 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Hinder Disro1·ery.· iii \\'tzys U1U1t:ce.ss.zry· 1vr.d Unjust, 
1EGALTIMES,July27, 1998,at21. 
34. See id. Indeed, the chair of the Advisory Committee candidly admiued that: 
The beginning was a strong disclosure rule that could be, and was, defeated by 
local option. The next step is a diluted disclosure rule that cannot be defeated 
by local option. Perhaps in several more years the time \\ill come for a strong 
disclosure rule that cannot be defeated by local option. 
Stotler, Memorandum, supra note 9, at 30. 
35. See Willging et al., supra note 13, at 543, 592; Carter, supra note 15, at 20. 
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the subject matter involved in the pending action."36 The new version 
limits the scope of discovery to information that is "relevant to the claim or 
defense," and parties can only acquire material that is "relevant to the 
subject matter" by filing motions showing good cause why they should have 
broader discovery.37 The rule revisors' apparent purposes in devising the 
change are to restrict discovery and fishing expeditions by limiting parties 
to discovery that involves matters which they raise in the pleadings.38 
Several important aspects of the alteration in discovery's scope resemble 
significant features of the 2000 amendment of the mandatory automatic 
disclosure rule. First, it is not clear why the rule revision entities adopted 
this modification at the current time. 
For instance, the FJC and RAND evaluations suggest that discovery 
operates effectively in most lawsuits and that the 1993 amendments have 
functioned rather well. 39 Insofar as overly broad discovery creates 
complications, judges have numerous ways of restricting its breadth. 
Were change in discovery more clearly needed at this juncture, the 
revision prescribed might not foster marked improvement. For example, 
the modification might fail to narrow discovery. The amendment 
substitutes a new standard, which will probably promote satellite litigation 
over interpretation of the scope of discovery; the longstanding "subject 
matter" standard has relatively certain meaning and is one with which 
judges, attorneys, and litigants are familiar. The revision might 
concomitantly erode the conventional notice pleading regime that the 
original Advisory Committee instituted in the initial Federal Rules 
during 1938 and that federal judges have carefully cultivated over the 
course of the ensuing six decades.4° For instance, the "claim or 
36. Information can be discovered if it "appears reasonably calculated to lead to 
the discovery of admissible evidence," even if the material is inadmissible at trial. FBD. 
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(I). See generally Beckerman, supra note 3, at 513-17 (describing the 
goals of broad discovery rules); Marcus, supra note 4, at 748-49 (discussing the 
broadening of discovery between 1938 and 1970); Subrin, supra note 3, at 734-45 
(analyzing early judicial reactions to discovery reform). 
37. Amendments, supra note 1, at 388. See generally Gregory P. Joseph, Civil 
Rules II, NAT'LL. J., Apr. 24, 2000, at Al7 (discussing the 1998 proposed changes to the 
scope of discovery); Thornburg, supra note 6, at 237-39 (same). 
38. See Stotler, Memorandum, supra note 9, at 27, 32-33; Cavanagh, supra note 
33, at 21. 
39. See Kakalik et al., supra note 13, at 682; Willging et al., supra note 13, at 534-
35. The 1993 revisions apparently restricted the contentiousness that attends discovery, 
while enabling litigants to secure needed discovery. Tobias, supra note 16, at 1440. But 
cf Beckerman, supra note 3, at 506-09 (noting that "discovery disputes occur in 
substantially greater numbers than in years past"). 
40. See, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination 
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); see also Carl W. Tobias, Elevated Pleading in 
Environmental Litigation, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357 (1994) (analyzing the effect of the 
Leathennan case on pleading requirements); Letter from Richard H. Middleton, supra 
note 17, at 2 (arguing that changing the scope of discovery would abolish notice 
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defense" language may require that plaintiffs draft comparatively specific, 
fact-based pleadings before they can gain access to material under 
defendants' control that was previously available under general notice 
pleading.41 Thus, to secure the discovery formerly available, the new 
definition of the scope of discovery might prompt plaintiffs to draft 
broader pleadings than the information they have can support, thereby 
making themselves more vulnerable to motions to dismiss under Rule 
12(b) and motions for sanctions under Rule 11. -1:.? 
Circumscribing discovery could also frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs 
to prove and settle their lawsuits. The provision for judges to grnnt 
increased discovery on parties' motions for good cause shown might 
ameliorate this situation. Nevertheless, certain practical realities of 
modem federal civil litigation could make the provision deficient. 
Those phenomena include the costs that plaintiffs must incur when they 
request enhanced discovery, the pressures that increasing lawsuits and the 
growing need for judicial case management impose on the district courts, 
the reluctance on the part of many in the federal judiciary to spend limited 
resources on discovery controversies, and numerous judges' distaste for 
resolving discovery disputes.43 These circumstances, in combination with 
the diminished information that litigants must divulge through automatic 
disclosure,44 may detrimentally affect the relative equilibrium which has 
heretofore prevailed between the interests of plaintiffs and defendants.45 
pleading). See generally Beckennan, supra note 3, at 534--43 (discussing discovery's 
functions in a notice pleading system); Marcus, supra note 22 (discussing !he notice 
pleading system). 
41. See Joseph, supra note 37, at Al7; Zuchlewski. supra note 30. at 6. These 
impacts deserve comparison wilh !he effects !hat the disclosure amendment could have. 
See supra note 22 and accompanying text 
42. See generally Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and CM/ Rights Utigatio11. 37 BUFF. L 
REv. 485 (1988-89). 
43. For a discussion of judicial reluctance to manage discovery, i.cc Beckerman, 
supra note 3, at 565-69. For a suggestion !hat !he amendment was intended 10 force lhe 
judiciary to play a bigger role in managing discovery, sec Thornburg, supm note 6, at 
251-52. See also Joseph, supra note 37, at Al7 ("Judges who are not eager to hear more 
discovery disputes are not likely to be excited by the prospect of more motion practice 
devoted to lhe pleadings, but the drafters detennined otherwise."). 
44. See supra notes 21-22, 31 and accompanying text. 
45. See Beckerman, supra note 3, al 540-41; Cavanagh, supra note 33. at 25; Jeffrey 
W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of 
Discovery "Refom1," 64 LAw & CoNlEMP. PROBS. 198 (2001 ); Thornburg, sr1pm note 6, al 
262 ('The proposed amendments go part of the way toward giving the business lobby what it 
asked for"); Zuchlewski, supra note 30, al 6; Letter from Richard H. Middleton, sr1pra note 
17, at 2-3. But see Scirica, Memorandum, supra note 13, al 356-58; Stotler, Memorandum. 
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Finally, the new proviso would govern all lawsuits, even though the FJC 
and RAND assessments indicate that overly broad discovery only poses 
problems in a few comparatively complicated cases.46 
3. Presumptive Limitations on Depositions 
Analogous notions apply to the change that imposes presumptive 
limitations on oral depositions of one day of seven hours.47 For 
example, it remains unclear precisely why the amendment is necessary at 
this particular time. When the length of depositions creates difficulties, 
judges can invoke Federal Rule 30 or match temporal restrictions with a 
specific lawsuit's requirements in pretrial conferences.48 The modification 
also governs every case, but limitations might be needed only in a small 
number of suits.49 
B. General Ideas 
The evaluation above shows that the components of the 2000 
amendments that are most controversial and that significantly alter the 
Federal Rules have several commonalities. First, the present necessity 
for change, especially in light of the FJC and RAND determinations that 
automatic disclosure and discovery have worked relatively well since 
1993, is not clear. Second, insofar as disclosure or discovery fosters 
problems that require treatment, the complications appear to occur in 
comparatively few actions, and judges have many means of addressing the 
difficulties presented. These facts indicate that the rule revisors' decision 
to have the new strictures apply in all cases may be unwarranted. Third, even 
if there actually were a greater need for modification, the amendments 
might not ultimately constitute improvements. For instance, the alterations 
could tip toward defense interests, thereby altering the longstanding, 
carefully calibrated balance obtained between plaintiffs and defendants.50 
Parties will be entitled to less material or will have to absorb increased 
costs when pursuing information to which they formerly had access, and 
these changes may well have more adverse effects on plaintiffs. The 
supra note 9, at 27 ("[W]e have not proposed reducing the breadth of discovery, nor have we 
intended to undermine the policy of full and fair disclosure in litigation."); Carter, supra note 
15, at 20 (quoting Judge Paul Niemeyer, chair of the Advisory Committee, who asserts 
that the new rules are "the best shot we have for the overall system rising above any 
particular interest"). 
46. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
47. See Amendments, supra note 1, at 393 (amendment of Rule 30(d)(2)). 
48. See Cavanagh, supra note 33, at 25. 
49. Tobias, supra note 16, at 1440 n.42. 
50. See supra notes 31, 41, 45 and accompanying text. 
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disclosure and discovery revisions will also replace provisos that have 
rather definite meaning, and to which judges, parties, and lawyers are 
accustomed, with new language that might prove ambiguous, necessitate a 
decade of implementation and construction, and promote expensive 
ancillary litigation. If the amendments in fact operate as the rule revision 
entities intended, however, the modifications may have salutary impacts. 
For example, the alterations might improve discovery by conserving the 
substantial resources that courts, clients, and attorneys currently expend 
and by limiting discovery abuse.51 
A number of the propositions discussed, therefore, suggest that the 
disadvantages that particular components of the 2000 Federal Rules 
amendments will apparently impose alone and in combination may be 
larger than the benefits. Nonetheless, these ideas are comparatively 
controversial and relatively unclear, and the expen rule revisors developed 
the new provisos after commissioning analyses and conducting considerable 
study as well as seeking and evaluating public input The fourth pan of 
this Essay, accordingly, provides recommendations for the litigants and 
counsel who must comprehend and satisfy the new rules, judges who 
will interpret and apply them, and Congress and the federal judiciary 
which should monitor them. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Parties and Counsel 
The earlier analysis indicates that the Federal Rule revision entities 
intended the 2000 amendments individually and together to narrow 
discovery, but at the same time, the changes could complicate the efforts 
of parties, especially plaintiffs, to secure needed infonnation that was 
previously available.52 Litigants will still be able to obtain this material, 
however, albeit with greater difficulty and expense. For instance, the 
alteration of automatic disclosure requires parties to divulge less 
information at the outset of the litigation. However, virtually all of the 
material that the 1993 revision mandated be disclosed, and that the 2000 
amendment may not, can ultimately be acquired through subsequent fonnal 
51. This assumes that the idea of discovery abuse, over which therl! has been 
perennial, controversial debate, can be satisfactorily defined, delineated, and treated. 
See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 32, at 684; Jack B. Weinstein. \VIiar Discmw)· .4b11se? A 
CommentonJolm Setear'sThe Barrister and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L REv. <H9t1989). 
52. See supra notes 20-49 and accompanying text. 
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discovery. The narrowing of the information which must be exchanged 
without demand might prove responsive to concerns expressed about the 
1993 revision that instituted disclosure. These concerns include 
confusion over exactly what material the parties are to divulge, the 
potential for one litigant to make the opposing side's case, and certain 
ethical dilemmas that the 1993 amendment purportedly created.53 
Analogous ideas apply to the 2000 revision that limits the scope of 
discovery. For example, insofar as parties already possess, or have 
access to, material that enables them to plead with particularity, the 
litigants can generally secure information similar to that which they 
could acquire before the 2000 amendment. Some parties that do not 
have, or lack access to, such information may be able to conduct 
prefiling investigations that permit them to plead with sufficient 
specificity. Litigants that cannot so plead can still secure the material with 
motions that make good cause showings why the parties are entitled to 
that information.54 Judicial reluctance to resolve discovery disputes,55 as 
well as the tactical and economic incentives that accrue from opposing 
discovery motions, could frustrate attempts to obtain more material. 
This unwillingness on the part of many judges, the dislike of some for 
discovery controversies, and the threat that others will strictly or rigidly 
enforce discovery commands may encourage litigants to compromise their 
differences without invoking the judicial machinery, a practice which the 
Advisory Committee expressly condones.56 
The rule revisors' reinstitution of nationally applicable requirements in 
most discovery rules will apparently yield more benefits than disadvantages. 
The deletion of practically all of the local option provisos should assist 
parties and attorneys who litigate in multiple districts by diminishing the 
need to find, understand, and satisfy disparate local discovery mandates. 
The principal beneficiaries of the new uniformity will be institutional 
entities, including large law firms and defendants (namely corporations), 
as well as the United States Department of Justice (which is involved in 40 
percent of federal court cases), and national public interest groups, such as 
environmental and civil rights advocates. However, parties and counsel 
should remember that a few local option provisions will remain in 
53. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
54. "The good-cause standard warranting broader discovery is meant to be 
flexible." Amendments, supra note I, at 389 (advisory committee's note). 
55. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
56. "In general, it is hoped that reasonable lawyers can cooperate to manage 
discovery without the need for judicial intervention." Amendments, supra note I, at 389 
(advisory committee's note). Similar dynamics may apply to the presumptive limitations 
that the rule revisors imposed on depositions. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying 
text. 
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effect57 Moreover, inconsistent strictures govern locaJ discovery practice in 
the ninety-four federal district courts, ranging over a broad spectrum 
from formal local rules to unwritten individuaJ-judge practices.5s 
B. Judges 
Judges must be aware of, and attempt to remedy or ameliorate, the 
possible difficulties that were delineated earlier in this Essay. Perhaps most 
important is the potential to alter the rather delicate balance that previously 
existed between the interests of plaintiffs and defendants.59 The original 
Federal Rules instituted, and many subsequent amendments preserved, a 
system of general notice pleading and flexible, liberal discovery; the rule 
revision entities intended amendments of the Federal Rules to maintain 
that scheme and the plaintiff-defendant equilibrium, and to foster 
resolution of disputes on the merits. 60 Rules revisions since 1938, 
including the 1983, 1993, and 2000 amendments, which did limit discovery 
somewhat, were not meant to modify this regime substantially.bl 
These ideas mean that judges must be alert to, and institute, efforts 
that will rectify or reduce certain problems that the 2000 revisions may 
create. More specifically, when plaintiffs lack, or cannot secure access 
to, material that they need for pleading with the requisite particularity to 
satisfy the 2000 amendment to the scope of discovery. judges should 
find this sufficient to meet the good cause showing. Members of the 
judiciary, therefore, should flexibly and pragmatically apply the new 
stricture on discovery's scope,62 remembering that several major policies 
underlie the Federal Rules generally and notice pleading and broad 
57. See, e.g., Amendments, supra note 1, at 392-93 (FED. R. C1v. P. 26(f} advisory 
committee's note); see also Ame11d111e11ts, supra note 1, at 391 (FED. R. C1v. P. 26(bJ(2J 
advisory committee's note) (stating that Rule 36 authorizes local rules imposing 
limitations on requests for admissions). 
58. For analyses of the extent and consequences of local rule variation. M!C 
Gregory C. Sisk, The Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The Proliferario11 of Loml 
Rules in the Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1997); Carl Tobias. Cfri/ Justice 
Refonn and the Balkanization of Federal Cfril Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. W. 1393, 1398-
99 (1992); Carl Tobias, Local Federal Cfril Procedure for the Tll'emy-Firsr Ce11111ry, 77 
NOTREDAMEL. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2001 ). 
59. See supra notes 31, 41, 45, 50 and accompanying text. 
60. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 22, at 433-34; Subrin, supm note 3, at 710-34; 
Tobias, supra note 2, at 1591-92. 
61. See, e.g., Scirica, Memorandum, supra note 13, at 356-58: Marcus, supra note 
4, at 760-68; Subrin, supra note 3, at 734-45. 
62. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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discovery specifically. Those policies include permitting plaintiffs' 
cases to proceed even though the parties cannot plead with particularity, 
affording the litigants access to infonnation that might allow the parties to 
prove their contentions or facilitate settlement, and avoiding technicalities 
which prevent merits-based disposition of lawsuits.63 In short, judges 
must keep in mind the potential "catch-22" that the change in discovery's 
scope could impose. The new provision permits discovery of material 
that is "relevant to the claim or defense;" however, plaintiffs may not 
have the very infonnation that would enable them to draft pleadings 
specific enough to make needed material "relevant" to their claims.M By 
way of contrast, when plaintiffs engage in fishing expeditions, judges could 
honor the rule revisors' intent with limitations on this type of activity.65 
Members of the bench should also be aware of and address strategic 
efforts to capitalize on infonnational and resource disparities between 
litigants. For example, plaintiffs who pursue employment and civil 
rights litigation alleging discrimination frequently have little infonnation, 
few financial resources, and limited political power, especially in 
comparison with defendants, which are often corporate or governmental 
entities.66 Judges must be sensitive to the possibility that some 
defendants will rely on these discrepancies to disadvantage plaintiffs. For 
instance, defendants can deny plaintiffs access to material, require them to 
file motions and seek court orders, demand the litigants' particil?ation in 
hearings and conferences, and deplete plaintiffs' scarce resources. When 
members of the judiciary detect this type of activity, they should 
expeditiously and firmly respond to it. For example, judges might 
63. See supra notes 54, 60-61 and accompanying text. Similar ideas apply to the 
narrowing of disclosure and the deposition limitations effected by the 2000 revisions. 
Judges should be alert to the possibility that the alterations will complicate plaintiffs' 
efforts to obtain information needed to prove or settle suits and, if that prospect 
materializes, be prepared to institute appropriate measures. See supra notes 20-35, 47-
49 and accompanying text. 
64. The Advisory Committee stated: 
The rule change signals to the court that it has the authority to confine 
discovery to the claims and defenses asserted in the pleadings, and signals to 
the parties that they have no entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or 
defenses that are not already identified in the pleadings. 
Amendments, supra note 1, at 389 (FED. R. Clv. P.26(b)(l) advisory committee's note). 
This "catch-22" resembles the analogous phenomenon created by the 1983 amendment 
to Rule 11, which the rule revisors substantially amended again in 1993. See Tobias, 
supra note 42, at 493-95; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 
189, 200-01 (1988). 
65. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
66. See, e.g., Phyllis Tropper Baumann et al., Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: 
The Integration of Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. Rav. 
211, 296-99 (1992); Tobias, supra note 42, at 495-98. 
67. See, e.g., Baumann et al., supra note 66, at 225-95; Tobias, supra note 58, at 
1422-25. 
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accord plaintiffs increased access to information that defendants possess, 
flexibly grant plaintiffs more time for taking depositions than amended 
Rule 30 prescribes, reject defense motions, limit defendants' requests for 
meetings, or even impose sanctions on defendants if warranted. Certain 
plaintiffs may similarly attempt to extract tactical benefits by, for instance, 
seeking overly expansive discovery. Members of the bench must be alert 
to this possibility and treat the parties' conduct as judges would address 
analogous behavior of defendants. 
Members of the judiciary should institute actions that conserve and 
protect the courts' scarce resources. For example, judges could encourage 
litigants and counsel to meet and confer in an effort to resolve discovery 
disputes without judicial intervention while stringently enforcing the 
Rules that require party consultation.68 Members of the bench might 
also employ incentives that facilitate that activity or rely on measures, 
such as sanctions to discourage inappropriate conduct, namely the failure 
to cooperate. 
C. Congress and the Federal Judiciary 
Congress and the federal judiciary should closely monitor the 
implementation and application of the 2000 federal rules amendments. 
For instance, lawmakers or the courts could commission studies of the 
revisions' operation by an expert, independent entity, such as RAND or 
the FJC. Evaluators must rigorously analyze the recent changes by 
collecting, examining, and synthesizing the maximum relevant empirical 
data. 
As a general matter, assessors should undertake studies that resemble 
those conducted by RAND and the FJC.69 For example, evaluators might 
consider how frequently the 2000 amendments pose particular kinds of 
difficulties, for which parties and attorneys, and in what types of cases. 
Assessors could specifically emphasize the possible problems that derive 
from the narrowing of disclosure and the scope of discovery identified 
above. These complications include the potential to upset the balance 
between plaintiffs and defendants by limiting plaintiffs' access to 
information, thereby restricting their capacity to plead, prove, and settle 
cases. Evaluators should also scrutinize the 2000 revisions' effects on the 
costs of litigation and time to disposition. Other important questions will be 
68. See FED. R CIV. P. 26(f), 37(a)(2}; supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
69. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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whether the amendments generate unwarranted, expensive satellite 
litigation, particularly over the modifications' phraseology, and if so, how 
much and at what cost. Assessors might concomitantly examine the ways 
in which judges interpret and enforce the changes; how parties and 
lawyers discover, employ, and satisfy them; and implementation's 
salutary and detrimental impacts for the judiciary, litigants, and counsel. 
Finally, evaluators should analyze the effects of eliminating many local 
option provisions related to discovery. This Essay's earlier assessment 
suggested that the reinstitution of nationally applicable strictures affords 
certain benefits. For instance, it would save resources that parties and 
attorneys must devote to finding, understanding, and satisfying diverse 
discovery mandates.70 However, the abrogation of local option provisions 
can limit the courts' flexibility to test promising discovery procedures and 
develop commands tailored to peculiar local complications.71 If careful 
scrutiny supports these assertions, Congress and the judiciary may want to 
consider adopting a 1991 proposed amendment to Federal Rule 83 that 
would have authorized the federal districts to experiment with efficacious 
measures for five years. 72 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court recently promulgated a significant package of 
discovery amendments that became effective during December 2000. 
Litigants and lawyers should master and comply with the new strictures, 
individual district judges must sensitively apply and construe them, and 
members of Congress and the judiciary should closely monitor the 
requirements' nascent implementation. 
70. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
71. See A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Management: The Challenge of 
the Civil Justice Refonn Act of 1990, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 877, 888-94 (1993). See 
generally Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension With 
Unifonnity, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 853 (1989). 
72. The proposed revision of Rule 83(b) is contained in Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S., Proposed Rules: Preliminary 
Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 153 (1991). The Rule revisors withdrew the proposal 
out of apparent deference to contemporaneous experimentation under the Civil Justice Refonn 
Act of 1990. See A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of 
Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1582-83 (1991). 
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